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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the criminal justice system has paid significant attention
to the role of neuroimaging in the criminal trial process.' The criminal

Professor Emeritus of Law. New York Law School; Founding Director, International
Mental Disability Law Reform Project; Founding Director, Online Mental Disability Law

Program; Co-Founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates; J.D. Columbia
University School of Law; A.B., Rutgers University.
Staff Attorney, Disability Rights New York; Associate, Mental Disability Law and
Policy Associates; J.D., New York Law School; M.A., New York Law School; B.A., Mount
Holyoke College.

1 On neuroscience in the criminal courtroom in general, see CHRIS

WILLMOTT,

(2016); Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind": Criminology, Scientific
Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016) [hereinafter, Perlin
Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind']; Jennifer Bard, "Ah Yes, I Remember It Well":
Why the Inherent Unreliability of Human Memory Makes Brain Imaging Technology a Poor
Measure of Truth-Telling in the Courtroom, 94 OR. L. REv. 295 (2016); Jennifer Kulynych,
Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior: Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence, 36 Jurimetrics J.
235 (1996); Deborah W. Denno, How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Difer in Their
Use ofNeuroscience Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REv. 453 (2016).
&
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justice system has mostly done so in matters involving insanity defense, 2
death penalty mitigation, 3 death row defendants' competency to be
executed,4 and access to experts. 5 The potential use of neuroimaging,
however, transcends these areas of law. Because there is "general
agreement and substantial proof of reliability that CT scans and MRI
technology can detect brain injury, damage or atrophy." 6 neuroimaging may
help shed light on all aspects of the criminal process. 7

See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How
Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L.
REV. 885 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin, Great Skill]. See generally LEGAL INSANITY AND THE
BRAIN: SCIENCE, LAW AND EUROPEAN COURTS (Sofia Moratti & Dennis Patterson, eds.,
2

2016).
Professor Stephen Morse--one of the most important scholars in this area of law and
policy-has concluded that "neuroscience can potentially help refine mental state categories,
such as mens rea and mental disorder through a conceptual-empirical equilibrium in which

legal categories guide neuroscientific investigation that in turn then help clarify the legal
categories."
Stephen J. Morse, Actions Speak Louder Than Images: The Use of
Neuroscientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, I J. L. & Biosci. 1, 6 (2016) [hereinafter,
Morse, Actions Speak Louder].
See John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Defense's Use of Neuroimages in Capital CasesLessons from the Front, 62 MERCER L. REV. 909 (2011).
4 See Michael L. Perlin, "Good and Bad, I Defined These Terms, Quite Clear No
Doubt Somehow": Neuroimaging and Competency to be Executed after Panetti, 28 BEHAV.

Sci. & L. 671 (2010) [hereinafter, Perlin "Good and Bad'].
See Perlin, Great Skill, supra note 2; Michael L. Perlin, "And I See Through Your
Brain ": Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic
Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal TrialProcess, 2009 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
4 [hereinafter Perlin, See Through Your Brain].

The most famous case of any sort in which neuroimaging raised was that of John W.
Hinckley, who attempted to assassinate President Reagan.

See Perlin, Great Skill, supra

note 2, at 896-98. Hinckley was institutionalized at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington,
D.C. for thirty-five years after being granted limited conditional release in 2014. See United
States v. Hinckley, 35 F. Supp. 3d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2014). He was ordered released in 2016.
See Zoe Tillman, President Reagan Shooter John Hinckley Jr. Granted Release, LAW.COM
(July 27, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/07/27/president-reagan-shooter-

john-hinckley-jr-granted-release/?slretum=20160629095406.
For the saga of Hinckley's
multiple court hearings seeking release, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (3d ed. 2017) § 14-3, at 14-215 to 14-216
n.1424.
6 Noel Shafi, Neuroscience and Law: The Evidentiary Value of Brain Imaging, 11
GRADUATE STUDENT J. PSYCHOL. 27, 32 (2009), quoting Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering

Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the U.S. Courts, 26 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 29, 40-41
(2008).
7 In addition to the areas discussed supra, it may also be significant in sentencing cases,
in matters of parole or probation revocation, or even, in some instances, in bail applications.
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Remarkably, scholars and judges have paid almost no attention to the
potential impact of neuroimaging on trial competency. 8 Less than a handful
of reported cases consider the use of neuroimaging in determinations of trial
competency on the merits, 9 and it is "under the radar" for most relevant
scholarship as well.' 0 Nevertheless, this inquiry is, numerically, the most
important "disability law" question relevant to criminal law." The costs of

For its potential application in sentencing cases, see Christopher Slobogin, Neuroscience
Nuance: Dissecting the Relevance of Neuroscience in Adjudicating Criminal Culpability, 4

J. L. & Biosci. 577, 582-84 (2017).
There is also much recent interest in how neurological development affects the culpability of
young offenders. See, e.g., Carly Loomis-Gustafson, Note, Adjusting the Bright-LineAge of
Accountability within the Criminal Justice System: Raising the Age of Majority to Age 21
Based on the Conclusions of Scientific Studies Regarding Neurological Development and

Culpability of Young Adult Offenders, 55 Duo. L. REV. 221 (2017).
Professor Morse remains skeptical, characterizing neuroscience's contributions to legal
doctrine and practice, as "modest at best." Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?An Essay
on Law and Neuroscience, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 529, 562

(Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
For a discussion on the way different kinds of neuroimaging have been used to make claims
about mental health or mental disability, see Moriarty, supra note 6.
8 On questions of criminal competency in general, see PERLIN & CucoLo,
supra note 5,

ch. 13.
9 See e.g., United States v. Puerto, 392 Fed. Appx. 692 (1 1th Cir. 2010); State v.
Holmes, 5 So. 3d 42 (La. 2008); State v. Marshall, 27 P.3d 192, 199 (Wash. 2001) (where
competency is at issue at time of trial, sentencing, or punishment, defendant is entitled to

assistance of expert testimony and testing, including neuroimaging). There is a more
substantial cohort of cases in which defendants appealed or sought post-conviction relief
based on their counsel's failure to seek funds for neuroimaging tests during the competency
assessment phase.
See Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar:
NeuroimagingEvidence in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577 (2016).
The most famous case that involved neuroimaging on the question of competency to stand

trial was United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding PET
scan evidence unreliable and unconvincing). Defendant, Vincent "The Chin" Gigante, was
alleged to have been the model for the "Uncle Junior" character on the television show, The
Sopranos. See Terry Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding," and the

CriminalDefendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1377 n.7 (2006) (discussing See Sopranos:
Whoever
Did This (HBO
television broadcast Nov.
10,
2002),
http://
www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season4/episode48.shtml).
See generally Perlin, Great Skill, supra note 2, at 895-96 (as of 2008, a simple Google
search of "Gigante and 'PET scan"' revealed 281 documents).
10 In his recent major article about neuroscience and the criminal law, Professor
Slobogin tells us, in the first footnote, "This article does not address the use of neuroscience
to assess competence or treatment issues, nor issues of criminal policy." Slobogin, supra
note 7, at 577 n.I.

"

As of 2007, literature suggested that each year 50,000 to 60,000 defendants are

evaluated for trial competency purposes. See Douglas Mossman, PredictingRestorability of
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competency hearings are "staggering," 1 2 and the incompetency status in no
way admits or presumes factual guilt.1 3 In fact, a recent comprehensive
study by Professor Deborah Denno, found that 800 cases that addressed
neuroscience evidence over a ten-year period failed to mention the question
of competency to stand trial.14
Given the number of such evaluations, and their potential significance to
both the individuals involved and the entire criminal justice system, it is
imperative that the ways in which neuroimaging may influence competency
determinations be studied and understood. In this paper, we briefly review
legal standards for competency in the context of mental disability and then
examine what neuroimaging may be able to add to competency
determinations. 15 We also examine neuroimaging's role in competency
determinations in the context of therapeutic jurisprudence and discuss
whether the introduction of scientifically-based evidence of incompetency
(which neuroimaging purportedly is) will lead to therapeutic outcomes for
defendant. 16 We conclude by offering suggestions for courts to consider in
the future as they attempt to come to grips with the advantages and
disadvantages of competence testimony based on neuroimaging reports.
Our title comes from the first verse of Bob Dylan's masterpiece, Love
Sick.1 7 That verse reads:
I'm walking through streets that are dead
Walking, walking with you in my head
My feet are so tired, my brain is so wired

Incompetent Defendants, 35 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 34, 34 (2007).
12 Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 928

(1985).
13 See Michael L. Perlin, "Everything's a Little Upside Down, as a Matter of Fact the
Wheels Have Stopped": The Fraudulenceof the Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 Hous.

J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239, 246 (2004) [hereinafter, Perlin, Wheels] ("[T]here is nothing in
the invocation of the incompetency status that at all concedes factual guilt"). The American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice underscore that the status of incompetence to
stand trial "has no bearing on guilt or innocence."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, ch. 7,

pt. IV (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015). Notwithstanding this fact, "it is assumed by all that the
defendant did, in fact, commit the crime." Michael L. Perlin, God Said to Abraham/Kill Me
a Son: Why the Insanity Defense and the Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and
Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477, 489 (2016) [hereinafter, Perlin,

God Said].
14 Deborah Denno, Concocting CriminalIntent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 334 (2017).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 19-52.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 53-108.
17

BoB DYLAN, Love Sick, on TIME OUT OF MIND (Columbia Records 1998).
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The question is posed: To what extent will the thoughtful and careful use
of neuroimaging testimony in mcompetency cases help staunch the
"weeping?"
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETENCY'

9

"Few principles are as firmly embedded in ... criminal jurisprudence as
the doctrine that an 'incompetent' defendant may not be put to trial." 20 The
doctrine is traditionally traced to mid-seventeenth century England.2 1 In
analyzing the roots of the competency doctrine, commentators generally
have focused on: (1) the incompetent defendant's inability to aid in his
defense; 2 2 (2) the parallels to the historic ban on trials in absentia;2 3 and (3)
the parallels to the problems raised by defendants who refused to plead to
the charges entered against them. 24
The primary purpose of the doctrine, under commentators' theories, was
to "safeguard the accuracy of adjudication," 25 and as early as 1899, a U.S.
federal court of appeals held that it was "not 'due process of law' to subject

1s Id.
9 Portions of this section are adapted from Perlin, God Said, supra note 13, at 487-89.
See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 5, at §13-1.2 (discussing a historical overview
of the substantive criteria for competency).
20 See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 5, §§ 13-1.1,
at 13-4.
21 See Bruce Winick & Terry DeMeo, Competency to Stand Trial in Florida, 35 U.
Miami L. Rev. 31, 32 n.2 (1980). See generally Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry,

Misuse of Psychiatry in the Criminal Courts: Competency to Stand Trial 912-15 (1974) and
HENRY Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 428-30 (1954). Roesch and
Golding have suggested that the same problems may have been present as early as the
thirteenth century.

RONALD Roesch & STEPHEN Golding, Competency to Stand Trial 10

(1980).
22

See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 24 (9th ed. 1783); 1 Hale, The History of the Pleas
&

of the Crown 34 (1847). See generally Richard Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants with Mental Retardation to Participatein Their Own Defense, 81 J. Crim. L.

Criminology 419, 419 (1990); Thomas Grisso, Five-Year Research Update (1986-1990):
Evaluationsfor Competence to Stand Trial, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 353, 357 (1992).
23 See Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-trialCommitment of Criminal Defendants, 108

U. Pa. L. Rev. 832, 834 (1960). This issue is discussed fairly fully in People v. Berling, 251
P.2d 1017 (Cal. App. 1953).
24 Until the late eighteenth century, if the court concluded that a defendant was
remaining "mute of malice," it could order him subjected to the practice of peine forte et
dure, the placing of increasingly heavy weights on the defendant's chest to "press" him for
an answer. See Ralph Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency to Stand Trial, 5 J.

Psychiatry & L. 165, 168-69 (1977). This practice was abolished in 1772.
25 Claudine Walker Ausness, The Identification ofIncompetent Defendants: Separating
Those Unfit for Adversary Combatfrom Those Who Are Fit, 66 Ky. L.J. 666, 668 (1978).
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such an insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or
life." 26 Contemporaneously, a state supreme court suggested, "[i]t would
be inhumane, and to a certain extent a denial of a trial on the merits, to
require one who has been disabled by the act of God from intelligently
making his defense to plead or to be tried for his life or liberty." 27
The rationale of the competency doctrine is clear. It is fundamentally
unfair to put a defendant to trial who may not have "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding [or] a rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings against him." 28 Incompetency is a status, not a defense. 29
Thus incompetency is in no way a concession of factual guilt (as is the
invocation of the insanity defense). 30 The American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice underscore that the status of incompetence to
stand trial "has no bearing on guilt or innocence." 3 1 Nonetheless, "it is
assumed by all that the defendant [invoking the incompetency status] did, in
fact, commit the crime."3 2
III. THE EFFECT THAT NEUROIMAGING MIGHT HAVE ON COMPETENCY
DETERMINATIONS

Neuroscience research has two goals: (1) to understand, and therefore to
predict; and (2) to manipulate, treat, or intervene for the benefit of the
human subject. 3 The use of neuroimaging to determine competency is still
26

Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899).

referring to an incompetent defendant.

The Court was clearly

The constant blurring of the terms "insanity" and

"incompetency" has been vexing. See, e.g., Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1041-43 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1971); State v. Bowman, 681

A.2d 469, 471 (Me. 1996); Harrison v. Settle, 151 F. Supp. 372, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1957);
Winick & DeMeo, supra note 21, at 36; ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 21, at 15-17.
27 See Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (Tenn. 1911); see also Ausness, supra note

25, at 670 (footnotes omitted) ("A seldom mentioned but powerful psychological reason for
the requirement that the defendant be competent is that in order to satisfy the urge of the
community to punish, the defendant must understand what he is being punished for.").
28 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). To be able to assist counsel, a
defendant should have the ability to communicate, the capacity to reason "from a simple
premise to a simple conclusion," the ability to "recall and relate facts concerning his
actions," and the ability "to comprehend instructions and advice, and make decisions based
on well-explained alternatives." PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 5, §§ 13-1.2.1, at 13-10

(footnotes omitted).
29 See Perlin, God Said, supra note 13, at 489, citing ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13.
30 Id.
31

32

ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13.
Perlin, Wheels, supra note 13, at 246.

On why the incompetency status is also

required by international human rights law, see Perlin, God Said, supra note 13, at 495-96.
3

Emily Murphy,

Paved with Good Intentions: Sentencing Alternatives from
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a new phenomenon. 34 In a competency hearing, if used successfully,
neuroimaging evidence could support a determination that a defendant is
not competent to stand trial.3 5 However, neuroimaging is still not widely
accepted in the courts, 36 because the potential for oversimplification of
complex brain function, through the use of imaging and simplistic
descriptions of imaging studies, could undermined the benefits that imaging
could provide in appropriate settings. 37 Professor Eyal Aharoni and his
colleagues have concluded: "Neuroscience has copious challenges to
undertake before becoming a reliable benefit to courtroom procedures." 3 8
Part of the difficulty in assessing competency based on neuroinaging is
the expert witness's knowledge of the legal standards of competency, as
opposed to his or her clinical expertise. 9While the courts determine

Neuroscience and the Policy of Problem-Solving Courts, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 83, 86

(2013).
34

Apparently, the first time that neurotesting was sought (and denied) in a case

involving competency to stand trial was in State v. Baldwin, 174 S.E. 2d 526 (N.C. 1970).
See Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36

HARv.

J.L. &

PUB.

PoL'Y 653, 708 (2013) ("Although it is not the norm, modem neuroimaging techniques are
now supplementing competency evaluations in some cases.").
3
Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at 656. Admission of this evidence in no way
guarantees that it will assist the defendant. See United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d

676, 722-25 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (entertaining MRI, PET, and computerized neuropsychological
testing evidence but ultimately finding it unpersuasive as to competency).
36 See Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at apps. A-C (listing all cases). See also
Slobogin, supra note 7, at 577 ("The usefulness of neuroscience in determining the

blameworthiness of a particular criminal defendant is highly contested").
37 See David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The Effect of Brain
Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 344 (2007) (criticizing
media for "oversimplify[ing] and misrepresent[ing] conclusions from brain imaging
studies"). See generally, Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A DiagnosticNote, 3 OHio ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 401 (2006) and Octavio Chen,
What Neuroscience Can and Cannot Answer, 45 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 278, 278

(2017).
38

Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal

Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1124 ANALYSIS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 145,
158 (2008). Professor Stephen Morse has asked pointedly whether we have carefully
considered the actual legal relevance of brain imaging to the trial process. See Stephen L.
Morse, Brain Imaging in the Courtroom: The Quest for Legal Relevance, 5 AJOB
NEUROSCIENCE 24 (2014). See also Zurizadai Balmakund, The Realities of Neurolaw: A
Composition of Data & Research, 9 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 189 (2015)
(discussing "how the interests of justice are challenged and strengthened by the introduction

of interdisciplinary research").
39 See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 663 (1993) [hereinafter, Perlin, Pretexts]
("[E]xperts' evaluations frequently rely not on the examiners' experience or knowledge but

on the facts of the act upon which the defendant was originally indicted.").
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competency, the courts rely heavily on the opinions of health care providers
Thus,
with expertise regarding mental and emotional processes.4 0
knowledge of both the legal standards of competency and the mental and
emotional rocesses, which support competency, has become increasingly
The issues become more complex because, as there is "no
important.
one-to-one mapping of a particular function to a particular brain region,"
the process of employing neuroimaging results to shed light on an
individual's mental capacity "does not entail a direct application of... data
to the question of incompetency; rather, it contains an analytical gap, which
is bridged by the expert's interpretation." 4 2
Competency can be described as a combination of:
[P]erception and comprehension of a relevant body of information;
memory and recall of relevant information well enough to support
further mental evaluation of the information; the capacity to identify
personal options implicit in the information and to logically deliberate
among the available options based on relative potential risks and the
benefits; and the capacity to make an enduring decision based on prior
logical deliberation. 4 3
Assessing competency is even more difficult in an individual with
executive dysfunction.4 4
Neuropsychological assessment, which is
traditionally used to assess cognitive functioning by experts and is
presented in competency evaluations, has not been as helpful in quantifying
40 Judge-examiner agreement regularly exceeds 90%. See Jennifer Skeem & Stephen
L. Golding, Community Examiners' Evaluations of Competence to Stand Trial: Common
Problems and Suggestionsfor Improvement, 29 PROF'L PSYCHOL. 357, 357 (1998).
41
See also Thomas Grisso, The Economic and Scientific Future of Forensic
Psychological Assessment, 42 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 831, 833 (1987) (criticizing "occasional
experts," or "psychologists who supplement their general clinical practice with occasional
forensic assessments" and "enter into forensic assessment with little or no specialized

forensic knowledge").
42

Sydney Roth, The Emergence of Neuroscience Evidence in Louisiana, 87 TUL. L.

REV. 197, 214 (2012), quoting, in part, Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a
Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past
Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1119, 1160 (2010).
43 G. Michelle Reid-Proctor, Karen Galin & Michael A. Cummings, Evaluation of
Legal Competency in Patients with FrontalLobe Injury, 15 BRAIN INJURY 377 (2001).
4 In these cases, the term "executive dysfunction" or "executive function deficits"

refer to a disruption or deficit in an individual's executive functioning, which manages highlevel cognitive functions. This dysfunction can impact an individual's ability to be goaloriented, regulate inhibition and impulses, make plans and perform some complex motor
functions. See Young v. Astrue, 2011 WL 6812153, *4 n.l (W.D. Mo. 2011). It is an
umbrella term for functions such as planning, working memory, impulse control, inhibition
and mental flexibility, as well as for the initiation and monitoring of action. See Elisabeth
Hill, Executive Dysfunction in Autism, 8 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE Sci. 26, 26 (2004).
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a defendant's ability to solve problems in a logical manner. 45 This ability
may be directly related to one's ability to assist in one's own defense.
The challenge of measuring competency through images, rather than
testing, is that imaging does not show many areas tested during a
neuropsychological examination. 46 While neuropsychological testing is
designed to measure aspects of mental function and to provide information
about an individual's ability to process, understand, and react appropriately,
neuroimaging does not simply provide a visual representation of this type of
information. Instead, brain images can only show areas of abnormality.4 8
It is up to clinicians to interpret what that might mean in a behavioral
context. 49

The other major vexing consideration is the inevitable intertwining of the
competency measurement issues with the fundamental reasons for
questioning competence initially.
A defendant with schizophrenia
fundamental differs from a defendant with a traumatic brain injury (TBI).5 0
Not only will the defendants' mental functions differ dramatically, but the
way their attorneys present their cases may also differ. An individual with
a TBI will frequently have a history of scans taken to show the locus of the
injury. 5 ' This locus is a visible marker that can serve as evidence of TBI.
By connecting that marker to symptoms, and ultimately, to competence, an
expert witness can use neuroimaging to paint a stronger picture of that

45 Reid-Proctor, Galin & Cummings, supra note 43, at 385.
4
See David Hughes et al., Abnormalities on Magnetic Resonance Imaging Seen
Acutely Following Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: Correlationwith Neuropsychological Tests
and Delayed Recovery, 46 NEURORADIOLOGY 550, 556 (2004), for the proposition that only

certain abnormalities will be visible or apparent in imaging studies, whereas
neuropsychological testing that assess brain function, competency, and other abilities may
&

provide a more comprehensive evaluation. For one example of the latter, see Claudia Jacova
et al., Neuropsychological Testing and Assessment for Dementia, 3 ALZHEIMER'S
DEMENTIA 299, 312 (2007).
47 Erik Parens & Josephine Johnston. Neuroimaging: Beginning to Appreciate Its
Complexities, 44 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT S2 (2014).
4 Id.; Adina L. Roskies, Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain? 74 PHIL.
Sci. 860 (2007) WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN (2001).

49 See generally Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Redux, 31 LAW & INEQ. 509, 52728 (2013) and Morse, Actions Speak Louder, supra note 2.

5o

On neuroimaging and TBI in general, see Erin D. Bigler et al., Structural

&

Neuroimagingin ForensicSettings, 84 UMKC L. REv. 301 (2015).
s1 Jane J. Kim & Alisa D. Gean, Imaging for the Diagnosis and Management of
Traumatic Brain Injury, 8 NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 8, 39 (2011); Chad W. Washington
Robert L. Grubb, Are Routine Repeat Imaging andIntensive Care Unit Admission Necessary
in Mild Traumatic Brain Injury? 116 J. NEUROSURGERY 549, 554 (2012).
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injury at issue. 52 In the case of an individual with schizophrenia, brains
scans will not show the same visible loci of the illness-mental illness
cannot be quantified, scanned or measured in the same way as can a TBI.5 3
Although there are studies pointing to abnormalities in certain regions of
the brain for individuals with schizophrenia, 54 a brain scan of a person with
schizophrenia will not exhibit an abnormality focal point in the way that a
brain scan of a person with TBI will.55 For that reason, neuroimaging may
not be appropriate for particular defendants such as those with
schizophrenia.
It is essential that courts assess testimony as to the relationship between
neuroimaging findings and the ultimate legal question before the court in
nuanced ways. As noted above, the first heavily-publicized incompetency
case that involved neuroimaging evidence was that of suspected Mafioso
Vincent Gigante. 56 In United States v. Gigante, the trial court rejected the
admissibility of "[positron emission tomography (PET)] and other brain
scans" 5 7 due to "speculative scientific theories," lack of baseline studies,

52

David H. Salat et al., Neuroimaging of Deployment-Associated Traumatic Brain

&

Injury (TB!) with a Focus on Mild TBI (mTBI) Since 2009, 31 BRAIN INJURY 1204 (2017);
Andrei Irimia et al., Structural and Connectomic Neuroimagingfor the Personalized Study
of Longitudinal Alterations in Cortical Shape, Thickness and Connectivity after Traumatic
Brain Injury, 58 J. NEUROSURGICAL SCt. 129 (2014); Maheen Adamson, Keith Main
Stephanie Kolakowsky-Hayner, Integration of Clinical and Research Neuroimaging to
&

Understand Traumatic Brain Injury in Veterans and Civilians, 96 ARCH. PHYs. MED.
REHAB. 12 (2015).

53 Philip K. McGuire & Kazunori Matsumoto, Functional Neuroimaging in Mental
Disorders, 3 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 6 (2004); Tobias Melcher, Peter Falkai & Oliver Gruber,
FunctionalBrain Abnormalities in PsychiatricDisorders: NeuralMechanisms to Detect and
Resolve Cognitive Conflict and Interference, 59 BRAIN REs. REv. 96 (2008).
54
See, e.g., Mark Slifstein et al., Deficits in Prefrontal Cortical and Extrastriatal
Dopamine Release in Schizophrenia: A Positron Emission Tomographic Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 316, 317-18 (2015); Lampros
Samartzis et al., White Matter Alterations in Early Stages of Schizophrenia: A Systematic
Review of Diffusion Tensor Imaging Studies, 24 J. NEUROMAGING 101 (2014); and J.
Fitzsimmons et al., Diffusion Tensor Imaging Study of the Fornix in First Episode
Schizophrenia and in Healthy Controls, 156 SCHIZOPHRENIA REs. 157, 160 (2014), for
examples of various types of studies that each aim to image or identify structural or
functional abnormalities in different regions of the brain, all possibly linked to
schizophrenia.
55 Neuroimaging studies of psychiatric illness are still examining clusters of disorders
based on diagnosis; there is not the same ability to recognize, diagnose and predict
prognoses as there is with traumatic brain injury. See e.g., Slifstein et al., supra note 54, at
317-18; Fitzsimmons et al, supra note 55, at 160.
56 See Perlin, Great Skill, supra note 2, at 895.
57 United States v. Gigante, 996 F. Supp. 194, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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and the limited number of controls.5 8 Gigante was the subject of saturation
publicity. 59 Pointedly, in discussing Gigante, Professors Gaudet and
Marchant dryly noted, "[c]ases that often make the news are not necessarily
representative of how certain evidence is presented and received." 6 0
Until neuroimaging evidence is used more frequently in cases involving
unknown defendants, "the distortion effect of famous cases will require our
speculations to remain tentative." 6 Perhaps of more significance is the more
recent case of United States v. Duncan,6 a death penalty case, in which the
court vacated the death penalty and remanded the case for a full
competency hearing on the question of whether the defendant had
competently waived his right to appeal.6 3 There, three experts found that
the defendant suffered from "delusional beliefs, paranoia, grandiosity, and
psychotic breaks with reality."6 Further, the experts produced results from
a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study and PET scan of the
defendant's brain, which showed "an unusual brain structure" consistent
with behavioral deficits in "the ability to make rational plans and modulate
emotions." 65
58

Id. at 205 (citing United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).

5

See Perlin, Great Skill, supra note 2, at 896 (observing that the Gigante case was the

subject of "intense publicity").
60 Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at 588 ("[T]he shortcomings
of the proffered
neuroimaging evidence and testimony do not lie in the scan technology itself but with its
application in a particular context"). The response to the Gigante case reflects the dominant

use of the vividness heuristic, a cognitive-simplifying device through which a "single vivid,
memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational
choices should be made." See Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You
from Me": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the
Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1375, 1417 (1997) [hereinafter, Perlin, "The
Borderline"], and further accentuates a mis-perception of reality. See Perlin, See Through
Your Brain, supra note 5, at *24. Professor Morse and a colleague are clear: "At present...
no study has validly used neuroscientific data to assess any form of criminal competence."
Stephen J. Morse & William T. Newsome, Criminal Responsibility, Criminal Competence,
and Predictionof Criminal Behavior, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE

150, 177 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies, eds. 2013).
61

See supra note 60.

62

United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242 (9 th Cir. 2011), cert. den., 566 U.S. 907

(2012).
63 Id. at 1250.

6 Id. at 1249.
65 Id. For other cases grappling with the same issues, see Johns v. United States, 2011

WL 6141059, *10 (S. D. Ala. 2011) (expert stating that, "It is [quite] likely, however, at this
time that there is some degree of permanent damage to the brain. Neuroimaging would be
necessary to confirm this," as part of a report issued about competency). See also United

States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d 676, 725 (M. D. Pa. 2005):
Although we find Dr. Gur credible with respect to his psychological evaluation and
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In recent years, there appears to be only one significant reported case in
which neuroimaging was critical to an incompetency to stand trial
disposition. 6 6 In United States v. Dreyer,67 the Ninth Circuit agreed with
defendant's contention that the lower court erred by not ordering a
competency hearing. 68 In support of this claim, the defendant pointed to
imaging evidence of "extensive frontal lobe damage" that likely caused
impairment in judgment. 69 The court concluded that the evidence created a
"genuine doubt" as to defendant's competency, and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing. 70 In light of the limited case law on neuroimaging in
competency matters, this area has neither developed nor has it been the
topic of robust appellate thought and consideration.

lV. THE MEANING OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE. 7 1
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past
three decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic
jurisprudence ("TJ").7 2 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for

neuroimaging of Mr. Hammer, we do not find credible Dr. Gur's conclusion that Mr.
Hammer was not competent and not acting voluntarily, intelligently and rationally at

the time of (1) the change of plea proceeding, (2) the proceeding where he discharged
counsel and was authorized to decide on his own whether to pursue an appeal and (3)
the proceeding before the Court of Appeals when he withdrew his appeal.
66 There have been other cases in which neuroimaging evidence was introduced or
sought to be introduced in cases involving other criminal competencies (e.g., competency to
plead guilty or competency to be sentenced. Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at 648.). See

United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242

( 9 th

Cir. 2011). On these "other" incompetency

questions, see Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky and Godinez: Competency Before and After
Trial, 21 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 297 (2003) and PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 5, at §§ 13-2 et
seq.
67 United States v. Dreyer, 705 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2013).

Id. at 958.
69 Id. at 962.

7o Id. at 965.
71 This section is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your

Orphan with His Gun": The International Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Implications ofJuvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 301 (2013); Michael
L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental Disabilities
and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch,
All His Sexless Patients],and Perlin & Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind", supra note

1. It also distills the work that one of the co-authors (Perlin) has done on this topic for the
past two decades-plus, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). See also Michael L. Perlin, "Have
You Seen Dignity?": The Story of the Development of TherapeuticJurisprudence,27 U.N.Z.

L. REV. 1135 (2017)..
72

See,

e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER,

THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE:

THE

LAW AS A

THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
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assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a
therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic
consequences.3
Therapeutic jurisprudence asks whether legal rules,
procedures, and lawyer roles can and should be reshaped to enhance their
therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles. 74
David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent tension in this inquiry
must be resolved: the law's use of "mental health information to imP rove
therapeutic functioning . . [cannot impinge] upon justice concerns."
As
one of us (Perlin) has written elsewhere, "[a]n inquiry into therapeutic
outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and
civil liberties." 76

KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK,
CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two

Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOuRO L. REV. 17 (2008); PERLIN & CUCOLO,

supra note 5,

§ 2-6, at 2-43 to 2-66. Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the

National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health
into Mental Health Law: TherapeuticJurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 27, 27, 32-33

(1992).
7 See Perlin, Great Skill, supranote 2, at 912. For a transnational perspective, see Kate
Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and TherapeuticJurisprudence,in DISPUTES
AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds., 2006).
74 Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain":
Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental
Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REv. 481 (2008); Michael L.
Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role
and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735,

751 (2005). On how therapeutic jurisprudence "might be a redemptive tool in efforts to
combat sanism, as a means of 'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist fagade,"' see Michael L.
Perlin, "Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist
Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PIr. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008)
[hereinafter Perlin, Mirror], quoting, in part, MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE:
MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRiAL 301 (2000).
See also, Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic
JurisprudenceMisunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 575, 585-86 (2008).

Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational
prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism ", 46 SMU L. REv. 373,
374-75 (1992). On how sanism "permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects
all participants in the mental disability law system," see Perlin & Lynch, All His Sexless
Patients,supra note 71, at 259.
7
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal

Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
76 Michael L. Perlin, A Law ofHealing, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L.
Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental DisabilityLaw, Theory and

Practice, Us and Them, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
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Using TJ, we "look at law as it actually impacts people's lives," 77 and
assess the law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being. 78
One governing TJ principle is that "law should value psychological health,
should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever
possible and, when consistent with other values served by law, should
attempt to bring about healing and wellness". 79 TJ supports an ethic of
care.
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity. 8
Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs" of TJ, voice, validation,
and voluntariness, 82 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If
that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and
taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the
outcome.
Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as
less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they
voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result
or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can
initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In
general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or

7
Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing
with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
7 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:Psychological Soft Spots
and Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION

45, 45 (Daniel P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 2006).
79

Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in

INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
so See Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in
Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L.
REV. 605, 60547 (2006). See also David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt
to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns about Therapeutic Jurisprudence
CriminalDefense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REv. 597, 599 (2007).
81

See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL

161 (2005).

On dignity in the sentencing process generally, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A

PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW

214-15 (2013).
82

Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and
TherapeuticJurisprudenceas Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 ToURo L. REv. 601, 627

(2008). On the importance of "voice," see Freckelton, supra note 74.
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at least participating in, their own decisions. 83
The question to be posed here is: when the criminal trial judges consider
neuroscientific tests in incompetency to stand trial determinations (or
choose to not consider it), to what extent does that decision-making
comport with TJ principles? 84 Georgia Zara has thoughtfully and carefully
considered how biologically-based criminological research can be
integrated into a TJ perspective on studying the behavior of offenders,8 5 but
few scholars have written about this specific issue. 86 Consequently, it is
sadly clear that the entire body of scholarship referred to in this section
has-so far-fallen on deaf ears in the context of the incompetency
process. 87
Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89, 94-95 (2002).
83

See also, AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
8

On the

extent to

which

criminal

sentencing decision-making

considers

neuroscientific tests and evidence in the context of TJ, see Perlin & Lynch, "In the
Wasteland of Your Mind, " supra note 1, at 342-47.
85
Georgia Zara, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as an Integrative Approach to
Understandingthe Socio-PsychologicalReality of Young Offenders, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 127,

128 (2002). There has been no follow up in the legal literature to this insight of Prof. Zara.
86 One of us (Perlin) noted this, with regards to the insanity defense some eight years

ago. See Perlin, Great Skill, supra note 2, at 913 ("There has been, however, almost no
therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship as of yet on the question that I am addressing here:
what are the TJ implications of greater reliance on neuroimaging testimony in cases in which

the defendant raises a non-responsibility defense?"). David Wexler has more recently called
on researchers to consider the parallel question of neuropsychology and law as they relate to
the solitary confinement for juvenile offenders. See David B. Wexler, New Wine in New

Bottles: The Need to Sketch a Therapeutic Jurisprudence "Code" of Proposed Criminal
Processes and Practices, 7 ARIz. SUMMIT L. REv. 463, 469 n.15 (2014). In another paper
about how juvenile civil commitment and criminal justice proceedings shame and humiliate
juveniles, the authors note how the fact that juvenile brains "continue to wire and rewire, [as

opposed to the brains of adults who] have more stable neural connections" needs to be
considered in assessing the likely outcomes of the legal proceedings in question. Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "She's Nobody's Child/The Law Can't Touch Her at All":
Seeking to Bring Dignity to Legal Proceedings Involving Juveniles, 56 FAM. CT. REv. 79, 81
(2018).
On the relationship between TJ and the role of counsel in the incompetency process in
general, see Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed by Enforced Insanity":
Some TherapeuticJurisprudenceDilemmas in the Representation of CriminalDefendants in
Incompetency andInsanity Cases, 33 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475 (2010).
87 Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, there has been great interest shown in the

&

relationship between TJ and the work of problem-solving courts. For a sampling of
scholarship by some prominent problem-solving judges, see for example Deborah Chase
Peggy Hora, The Best Seat in the House: The Court Assignment and JudicialSatisfaction, 47
FAM. CT. REv. 209 (2009); Michael D. Jones, Mainstreaming Therapeutic Jurisprudence
into the Traditional Courts: Suggestions for Judges and Practitioners, 5 PHOENIX L. REv.
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V. THE EXTENT TO WHICH NEUROIMAGING "FITS" WITHIN TJ
In a recent article, the two co-authors argued that "[i]f used correctly,
neuroimaging evidence could serve as a valuable tool for implementing
therapeutic jurisprudence principles in [cases involving individuals with
mental illness and traumatic brain injury]."8 The question to be posed here
is: to what extent can neuroimaging evidence exert an impact on a
determination about competency in a therapeutic way? Using Professor
Ronner's three V's, 89 we can begin to create an analysis that looks at the
therapeutic (or anti-therapeutic) benefits a defendant receives when his
brain is presented as evidence.
While scholars have produced TJ
scholarship on the importance of sentencing, using TJ principles, 90 and on
the ways in which biologically-based criminological research can be
integrated into a TJ perspective on studying the behavior of offenders, 9 1
few scholars have written about the specific issues presented here,
especially in the context of competency determinations and evaluations for
92
justice-involved individuals.
Courts have regularly been known to ignore the potential role of TJ either
because they are unaware of its benefits or because they believe it has no
place in decisions. 9 3 This is particularly problematic in new areas of law,

753 (2012); Michael S. King, Should Problem-Solving Courts Be Solution-FocusedCourts?,
80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1005 (2011); William Schma et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Using

the Law to Improve the Public's Health, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59 (2005); and Ginger
Lerner Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving Justice and Promoting Recovery, 19 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 577 (2010).
88 Perlin & Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind", supra note 1, at 355.
8 See Ronner, Songs of Validation, supra note 8 1.
90 See Michael L. Perlin, "I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He'd Lost Control": The
Impact of PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, UTAH L. REV.
881 (2015) [hereinafter, Perlin, "I Expected It to Happen"]. See generally, David B.
Wexler, A Tripartite Framework for Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Criminal
Law Education, Research, and Practice, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 11, 15 (David B. Wexler ed.,
2008) and Wexler, supra note 86.
9' See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender
Recidivism through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community
Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (2012); Perlin & Lynch, "In the
Wasteland of Your Mind", supra note 1, at 353; Zara, supra note 85, at 128.
92 On the TJ-related use of neuroscience in the settlement process, see
Richard Birke,
Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination of Scientific Innovations and Practical
Applications, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477 (2010).
9
For a particularly critical assessment-based on no empirical evidence-see Jennifer
Oriel, Society Expects Justice from Courts, Not Therapy, THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Jan.
30,
2017,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/jennifer-oriel/societyexpects-justice-from-courts-not-therapy/news-story/d I 877596825a28d6e5a087fc41817e37,
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including the area of law exploring the use of neuroimaging as evidence,
where precedential decisions can come from any jurisdiction at any time. 94
If the precedential decisions are based on anti-therapeutic principles, it will
be difficult to get TJ-centric practices back into the courtroom because
previous decisions may limit the use and scope of novel scientific evidence
in this context. 9 5
The danger in failing to recognize the precedential value of decisions
from other jurisdictions creates a divided legal system in which a person in
one jurisdiction has the ability to introduce evidence that another individual
elsewhere could not. This could be especially troubling for individuals with
mental illness and traumatic brain injury since the recognition of a physical
component of their illness could help to comport with the TJ principles of
dignity, voice, and validation. 96 The ability to adequately present evidence
to represent physical illness is generally available to individuals who have a
physical difference; physical illness can even be used as mitigation
evidence. 97 The opportunity for individuals with mental illness and brain
injury, who are already facing additional discrimination and bias, should
have a similar avenue through which they may present legitimate evidence.
If used correctly, with proper analysis about its therapeutic benefits,
neuroimaging evidence could serve as "a valuable tool for implementing
[TJ] principles." 98 Unfortunately, as we have noted in the past, "the entire
body of scholarship [on neuroimaging evidence and TJ] has fallen on deaf
responded to in Arie Freiberg & Becky Batagol, Therapy and Justice Belong Together,
THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE

IN

THE

MAINSTREAM

(Feb.

10,

2017),

https://mainstreamtj.wordpress.com/2017/02/10/therapy-and-justice-belong-together/.
94

For some example on the greater implications of our federalist system, see Ellen

Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State Courts in the

FederalSystem, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065 (1998).
9

See Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9 (exploring all caselaw that consider the

various uses of neuroimaging). We believe that because this is still such an evolving area of
law, any of the precedents set in these individual cases, some of which could be
contradictory, could ultimately lead to anti-therapeutic results in individual cases.
96 On juror response to evidence of physical brain "abnormalities" in insanity cases, see
Richard Redding, The Brain-DisorderedDefendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the
Twenty-First Century, 56 Am. U. L. REv. 51 (2006). On juror response to neuroscience
evidence in general, see Edith Greene & Brian S. Cahill, Effects of Neuroimaging Evidence
on Mock Juror Decision Making, 30 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 280 (2012), and Tanneika Minott
Born This Way: How Neuroimaging Will Impact Jury Deliberations, 12 DUKE L. & TECH.

REv. 219, 225-230 (2014).
97 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(d) (West 2012) (treating as a mitigating
circumstance when "[t]he defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that

is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is
amenable to treatment").
98 Perlin & Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind", supra note 1, at 355. We discuss

this extensively in id. at 350-58.
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ears in the contexts of criminal sentencing." 99
The potential benefits of neuroimaging as an alternative method of
discussing questions of competency fall squarely within the values that TJ
strives to promote.' 0 0 Research provides little information available about
neuroimaging as a tool of TJ.10 While there is a great deal of research on
judges' and jurors' perceptions of neuroimaging evidence, the TJ
community has yet to discuss whether such perceptions are therapeutic or
anti-therapeutic. 02 In light of the reality that "the science of neuroscience
has to be assessed in the sociopolitical context of a specific question of law
that is central to the specific case before the court," this gap is all the more
problematic. 103 Additionally, few authors have considered the multiple
levels on which this evidence may have an impact on competency
determinations.

104

Regardless of the outcome of the defendant's case, TJ-centric
practitioners must recognize that an individual can feel as if he received a
therapeutic benefit from the introduction of this evidence. 0 5 That

Id. at 352-53.
100 Another caveat to be added here (one beyond the scope of this paper): the potential

9

for prosecutorial misuse of victim neuroscience evidence. See Denno, supra note 14, at 360-

67. One of the co-authors (Perlin) has considered the therapeutic jurisprudence implications
of prosecutorial misconduct in cases involving defendants with mental and intellectual
disabilities in Michael L. Perlin, "Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You Blind":
ProsecutorialMisconduct and the Use of "Ethnic Adjustments" in Death Penalty Cases of
Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1437 (2016), and Michael L.
Perlin, "Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power": ProsecutorialMisconduct and Passive
Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trials of Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 73

WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2016).
'o1 But see Perlin & Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind", supra note 1, at 355 ("If
used correctly, neuroimaging evidence could serve as a valuable tool for implementing
therapeutic jurisprudence principles in these cases"). See, e.g., Wexler, THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 72, at 469 n.15 (calling on researchers to consider
neuropsychology and law as they relate to solitary confinement ofjuvenile offenders). For
TJ-focused considerations of neuroscience in other contexts, see A.J. Stephani, Symposium:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Children, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 13, 14 (2002); and Janet
Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, "I Know Better Than That": The Role ofEmotions and the
Brain in Family Law Disputes, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 351, 383 n.127 (2005).
102 See Perlin & Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind," supra note 1, at 341
("Attorneys and judges must also continue to understand how neuroimaging evidence is

perceived and internalized by jurors.").
103 Perlin, See Through Your Brain, supra note 5, at *1 (emphasis in original).
10 See E. Spencer Compton, Not Guilty by Reason of Neuroimaging: The Need for
Cautionary Jury Instructions for Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Trials, 12 VAND. J. ENT.

& TECH. L. 333, 335-36 (2010) (discussing the role of neuroscience evidence in the insanity
context).
05

See Ronner, supra note 83, at 94-95.
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therapeutic benefit may be based on the principles of voice, validation and
voluntariness that Amy Ronner has thoughtfully articulated. 106 Such a
benefit also fits perfectly within the construct of procedural justice, which
asserts that "people's evaluations of the resolution of a dispute (including
matters resolved by the judicial system) are influenced more by their
perception of the fairness of the process employed than by their belief
regarding whether the 'right' outcome was reached."' 0 7
An individual is given voice when he is allowed to speak for himself or
articulate something that he believes to be important. os In the case of
neuroimaging evidence, an individual may feel that he has been given the
opportunity to have a voice if he is able to offer evidence that supports what
he describes as symptoms of mental illness or explanations for his
behavior.1 09 If he views the evidence as bolstering his own testimony,which will thus be taken more seriously by a judge or jury,-he may feel as
if his testimony or any of his prior descriptions of his own internal thoughts
has been given voice."10
However, the balancing test here is clear: it is likely anti-therapeutic to
allow images, and analyses of these images by experts, to speak for the
defendant in place of the defendant's own testimony."' In an analogous
106 Id.

Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, Forging
Links and
Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and ProceduralJustice to Better
Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REv. 147, 200 (2012)
(quoting Tom R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice and the Courts, 44 CT. REv. 26, 26 (2007)). See
also, Larry Heuer, What's Just About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological
Perspective, 13 J. L. & POL'Y 209, 213 (2005) ("[P]rocedural fairness concerns, rather than
outcomes, are the best predictors of people's trust and confidence in the courts").
108 See Julie Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, 46 McGILL L.J. 663, 700 (2001)
107

(explaining the empowerment of self-expression).
109

Cf John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE
LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 245, 249-53 (David B. Wexler ed., 1990) (civil commitment
hearings give patients an opportunity to present and hear evidence in a meaningful court
procedure).

Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, in

110 See generally Bernard Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and Transformation
Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child

Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST.

THOMAS

L. REv. 561, 580-81 (2005). On the importance of "voice"

generally, see Ronner, supra note 83.
11 See Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin' Away? Will Our Nation's Mental Health Court
Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 811, 847 (2004)
(quoting in part Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics ofEmpowerment: Rethinking the Role of
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1655, 1696

(1996) ("A defendant will have more of a sense of overall satisfaction with the court system
when she perceives she has been permitted to speak "in her own voice and to determine ...

[her] own goals.")).
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area of the law, the TJ-centric attorney must recognize that the defendant's
own words and the words of the expert, confirming the defendant's
testimony, must coexist in mitigation cases.1 12
There are similar balancin tests for Ronner's other two principles of
validation and voluntariness.113 Ultimately, a TJ-centric practitioner needs
to be able to integrate novel scientific evidence into a presentation of
competency that highlights the defendant as a person, rather than a
caricature of a "mentally ill person" who cannot stand trial.11 4 These
methods of presenting competency evidence are not at odds. If used
correctly, they can strengthen case presentation and potentially set the
groundwork for further evidentiary presentations in a subsequent case.115 It
is essential that the TJ-involved lawyer engage in a dialogue with her client
about the underlying issues.11 6
It goes without saying that there are other issues at play here as well."17
A remarkably under-discussed issue is the application of the Supreme
Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington-creating a pallid

See Lisa Bell Holleran, Mitigation Evidence and the Ethical Role of a Defense
Attorney in a Capital Case, 36 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 97 (2017) (on the building of a death
penalty mitigation case that would comport with TJ values), and Russell Stetler, "Mental
Health Evidence and the Capital Defense Function: Prevailing Norms, 82 UMKC L. REV.
407 (2014).
113 Carolyn S. Salisbury, From Violence and Victimization to Voice and Validation:
Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Children's Law Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 623 (2004) (reviewing the importance of Ronner's "three Vs" as a therapeutic tool that
must be considered against the legal implications of a hearing).
114 See Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin
Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled CriminalDefendants, 14 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 61,
79 (1996) (statements by Colin Ferguson's initial counsel) (mentally ill criminal defendants
have been characterized by their lawyers as "raving" or "deranged").
115 See John Pyun, When NeurogeneticsHurts: Examining the Use ofNeuroscience and
Genetic Evidence in Sentencing Decisions through Implicit Bias, 103 CAL. L. REv. 1019
(2015).
11 See, e.g., Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun," supra note 71, at
480 (model conversations for clients raising the insanity defense or the incompetency to
stand trial status prior to sentencing); Perlin, "IExpected It to Happen ", supra note 90, at
924-25 (model conversations for individuals facing sexually violent predator commitments
raising the insanity defense or the incompetency to stand trial status); Heather Ellis Cucolo
& Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Dignity and Preventing Shame and Humiliation by
Improving the Quality and Education of Attorneys in Sexually Violent Predator(SVP) Civil
Commitment Cases, 28 FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 291, 326 (2017)). See also David B.
Wexler, Guiding Court Conversation Along Pathways Conductive to Rehabilitation:
Integrating ProceduralJustice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, I INT'L J. THER. JURIS. 367,
370-71 (2016) (suggesting conversations with client about relapse prevention planning).
117 See generally Perlin, See Through Your Brain, supra
note 5.
112
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"effectiveness of counsel standard" in criminal cases -to cases involving
neuroimaging testimony.1 1 9 To what extent have courts examined the
responsibilities of counsel to understand and contextualize this
neuroimaging evidence? 120 Although there is some case law supporting an
ineffectiveness claim in a death penalty case in which counsel failed to seek
funds for a brain scan, 12 1 research reveals no such Strickland-based
reversals in cases dealing with the specific topic of this paper
(neuroimaging and competency to stand trial).' 2 2
It is hard to imagine a more anti-therapeutic case than Strickland.1 23
Indeed, the ample bodies of case law construing the Strickland standard
rarely even consider the implications of TJ or TJ-based lawyering. 124 We
urge scholars, criminal defense counsel and judges to begin to assess the
sorts of cases we discuss in this paper through a TJ filter.125
Also, it is necessary to consider the extent to which judges will be
teleological in their determinations as to whether such evidence is
admissible. In a recent piece in which the co-authors looked at judicial
interpretations of neuroimaging evidence, they found that judges treated
biologically-based evidence in criminal cases involving questions of mental
" Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[W]hether counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result"). See also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES 150 (2013) ("In many

death penalty cases, Strickland is little more than an empty shell.").
119 See PERLIN & CucoLo, supra note 5, § 13-1.5.4, at 13-59 to 13-67 (explaining the.
application of Strickland in cases involving questions of competency to stand trial in

general).
120 See Perlin, See Through Your Brain, supra note 5, at *24 n. 88 (addressing the
responsibility of counsel to understand and contextualize neuroimaging evidence).
121

See, e.g., Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 781-82 (9th Cir. 2014).

122 See Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at app. C (identifying incompetency cases in

which neuroimaging was at issue that had successful appeals or applications for habeas
relief, but none of the identified cases appear to have involved a Strickland-based decision);
see discussed infra text accompanying notes 138-41; United States v. Dreyer, 705 F.3d 951

(9th Cir. 2013) (not citing Strickland).
123 See Perlin, Mirror, supra note 74, at 606.
124 See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Mr. Bad Example ": Why Lawyers Need
to Embrace TherapeuticJurisprudenceto Root out Sanism in the Representation of Persons
with Mental Disabilities, 16 Wyo. L. REv. 299, 319 (2016); Perlin, God Said, supra note 13,
at 517.
125 Compare Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, "Equality, I Spoke That Word/As Ifa
Wedding Vow ": Mental DisabilityLaw and How We Treat MarginalizedPersons, 53 N.Y.L.

SCH. L. REV. 9, 28 (2008-09) (citations omitted) ("The TJ filter can be used to shine light on
the presence of sanism and pretextuality and the false use of OCS in considerations of sex
offender law, the inadequacy of advocacy systems, outpatient commitment, institutional

rights law, the right to refuse treatment law, or health care/hospital law.").
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disability law (via privileging and subordination) so as to conform to the

judges' pre-existing positions.126

When we consider how courts are

typically teleological on the question of admission of evidence in
accordance with the rulings in cases such as Daubert and Frye, this should
not be a surprise. 127 There is no reason to doubt the glum conclusion of
Professor Susan Rozelle that "the game of scientific evidence looks
fixed."

28

In another recent
that judges often
unconsciously-in
distorted 'ordinary
126

manuscript, 129 one of the co-authors (Perlin) concluded
"decide cases teleologically, taking refuge-perhaps
time-worn heuristics o that appeal to their own
common sense."' 13 1 This teleological approach is

Perlin & Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind", supra note 1, at 343-44

(discussing the research reported in Nicholas Scurich & Adam Shniderman, The Selective
Allure

of

Neuroscientific

Explanations,

9

PLOS

ONE

(Sept.

10,

2014)

http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0107529).
127 See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 586-91 (1993) (crafting
a five-factor test for admissibility of evidence in federal trials); Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (designating general acceptance by the scientific community as
the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony).
128 Susan Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: CriminalDefendants and the Short End of the
Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 598 (2007). See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating
Expert Reliability: Are CriminalStandards of CertaintyBeing Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L.
REv. 99, 105-08 (2000). In sixty-seven cases of challenged government expertise, the

prosecution prevailed in sixty-one of these. Id. at 105. Out of fifty-four complaints by
criminal defendants that their expertise was improperly excluded, the defendant lost in fortyfour of these. Id. at 106. Contrarily, in civil cases, ninety percent of Daubert appeals were

by the defendants, who prevailed two-thirds of the time. Id. at 108.
129 Michael L. Perlin, "I've Got My Mind Made Up ": How Judicial Teleology in Cases
Involving Biologically Based Evidence Violates Therapeutic Jurisprudence, CARDOZO J.

EQUAL RTs. & Soc'L JUST. 42, 43 (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 42-43) [hereinafter,
Perlin, "I've Got My Mind Made Up "]. That paper was written "in an effort to re-focus on
therapeutic jurisprudence as a means of combatting teleology in the law." Id. at 35-36.
130
See Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The
Puzzling Role ofMitigatingMental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB.

POL'Y 239, 242 (1994) (explaining that heuristics are cognitive simplifying devices in which
vivid, negative experiences overwhelm rational data); see supra note 112.
131 See Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, Said I, 'But You Have No Choice': Why
a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's DecisionAbout Mental Health Treatment Even If
It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 73, 87-88

(2016) (footnotes omitted) ("Ordinary common sense' (OCS) is a 'powerful unconscious
animator of legal decision making.' It is a psychological construct that reflects the level of
the disparity between perception and reality that regularly pervades the judiciary in deciding
cases involving individuals with mental disabilities. OCS is self-referential and nonreflective: 'I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore
that's the way it is."'). See also Perlin, "The Borderline", supra note 60, at 1426 ("[W]e

accept an insanity defense system that is sanist, pretextual and teleological, a system that
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particularly problematic "in cases involving biologically-based evidence
since so much of this evidence is out of the ken of lay persons." 32
Such behavior similar flies in the face of the core precepts of
therapeutic jurisprudence. 33 We believe it is vital that fact-finders
acknowledge this reality in the case of neuroimaging evidence in the
context upon which we focus in this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION

As noted above, the vast majority of attention on the role of
neuroimaging in the criminal trial process, until now, has focused upon
cases involving death penalty trials, 13 4 and, to a lesser extent, upon insanity
defense cases. 135 But, as we also noted, there has been almost no
consideration of the application of neuroimaging evidence in the area of
criminal law in which mental status issues play the largest role: that of
incompetency to stand trial.1 36 Competency is an issue in more than 50,000

rests on the shaky underpinnings of heuristic reasoning and a false [ordinary common
sense]."); Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 39, at 665 (discussing Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d
589, 594 (5th Cir. 1990)) ("Taking refuge in 'ordinary common sense' they [the trial judge
and counsel] rejected the possibility that the defendant was mentally ill because he did not
'look' mentally ill.").
See generally Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality,
Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense, " Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive
Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 136-37 (1991). See Bert van
Roermund, The Embryo and Its Rights: Technology and Teleology, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1939,

1947 (2013) for an explanation on how teleology is "inspired" by alleged common sense.
132 See generally Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors'
Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 192 (2006)
(observing that, frequently, scientific evidence is presented by experts who are not told in
advance to make the content more relatable to a lay person, and attorneys questioning a
witness may also not have the scientific knowledge to break down the points that the expert

is making).
133

See Perlin, "I've Got My Mind Made Up", supra note 129 (manuscript at 41)

("Articulating the existence of this teleology and amassing legal and other policy-based
arguments against its perpetuation will go a long way towards fulfilling therapeutic
jurisprudence mandates").
134 See Blume & Paavola, supra note 3, at 931 (mitigation cases), and Perlin, "Good
andBad", supra note 4, at 688 (competency-to-be-executed cases).
1 See Perlin, GreatSkill, supra note 2, at 887; Aharoni, et al., supra note 38, at 158.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 8-13 (this excludes the publicity that followed
the Gigante case, as an outlier in large part because of its "made for TV" nature). See
Maroney, supra note 9, at 1377 n.7. On the application of the "vividness heuristic" to the
role of the Gigante case in this context, see Perlin, Great Skill, supra note 2, at 904. See also
Perlin, "The Borderline", supra note 60, at 1417 (the vividness heuristic is the cognitivesimplifying device through which a "single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of

abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be made.").
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cases per year. 137 Courts have looked carefully at the extent to which
mental illness or intellectual disability interferes with a defendant's ability
to "consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational [and] ...
13 8
so as to determine
factual understanding of the proceedings against him"
increase in
a
modest
been
has
there
Although
whether he can stand trial. 139
40
appellate
of
reported
the use of neuroimaging in recent years,1 the number
41
cases involving competency to stand trial remains statistically negligible.'
And, as we noted earlier, in recent years, only one significant case has been
reported in which neuroimaging was critical to an incompetency to stand
trial disposition. 142
The most recent survey article about the use of neuroimaging in the
criminal process concluded that there was a "general trend toward more
sophisticated and nuanced arguments and applications of neuroimaging
evidence in criminal law cases." 1 4 3 Notwithstanding the potential overuse
and misuse of this testimony, we believe that this trend is a good thing in
that the "nuanced" 14 4 use of such testimony may help us more accurately
determine whether some defendants are, in fact, competent or incompetent
to stand trial.
That said, we acknowledge that this will be a good thing only if (1)
counsel achieves a level of competency in this area of law (which, globally,
certainly does not seem to be the case now),1 4 5 and (2) the Supreme Court's
holding in Ake is expanded so that lawyers representing indi ent
defendants-far and away the "supermajority" of all criminal cases 46

137 See Mossman, supra note 11, at 34.

138 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
139 See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 5, at ch. 13.
140 See Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at 648. Many of these cases involve (1)

appeals based on ineffectiveness of counsel claims (where such brain imaging testing was
not sought), and (2) appeals based on trial court refusal to grant funds for expert testimony,

pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985)
(finding for a constitutional right to an expert in cases where defendant makes a showing that

his or her sanity at the time of the crime is going to be a significant issue at the trial). See id.
at 619-23 and 638-47.
141 See Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at 648 (finding that the most current research
article found 12 cases in the last three years in this cohort).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 67-71 (discussing United States v. Dreyer, 705

F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2013)).
143 Gaudet & Marchant, supra note 9, at 661.
'"

Id.

145 See generally id., at 619-23 and 638-47 (discussing cases involving ineffectiveness

of counsel).
'
It was believed a decade ago that 80% of all criminal defendants were indigent. See
Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A National
Crisis, 57 HASTFNGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006). It makes sense to believe that this figure is now
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receive court approval for expert funding. 147 Without this additional piece,
any discussion of neuroimaging in the criminal process becomes a "cocktail
party conversation," unmoored from the real world of criminal law and
procedure.1 48
Attorneys looking to integrate this type of evidence into their practice
need to be cognizant of when the use neuroimaging is appropriate.
Competency decisions are made about an individual's current mental state,
so any attempt to use brain imaging should only serve to highlight or
provide missing data about that mental state. 149 Attorneys should also be
aware of the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic value of this type of
neuroimaging evidence and the way it will be perceived by all parties
involved in the resolution of the case. 150 We must keep in mind the
warning that "without understanding the significance of an appropriate
reference class, juries may give too much weight to the fMRI data and
related expert testimony." 15 1

higher.
To this point in time, lower courts have been generally reluctant to extend Ake to
requests for funding for neuroimaging tests. See Perlin, See Through Your Brain, supra note
147

5, at **21-23.
In the most recent term, in McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017), the Court expanded

on its decision in Ake, holding that, "unless a defendant is 'assure[d]' the assistance of
someone who can effectively perform these functions, he has not received the 'minimum' to

which Ake entitles him." Id. at 1794, quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
See PERIN & CUCOLO, supra note 5, § 15-4.4, at 15-72 to 15-76. There do not appear to be
any reported cases as of this date that consider the impact of McWilliams on the issues
discussed in this paper.
148 On how "cocktail party" conversations distort the actual issues in mental disability
law, see for example, Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 126 n.377 (1991) (quoting
Jan Costello, Autonomy and the Homeless Mentally Ill: Rethinking Civil Commitment in the
Aftermath of Deinstitutionalization(paper presented at the American Association of Law
Schools, section on Law & Psychiatry, Annual Conference in San Francisco, California, Jan.

1990)).
149 There is often confusion about the proper timing of neuroimaging scans, and how
such timing does or does not fit into legal frameworks. For example, a neuroimage taken

close to a trial date, in support of an insanity defense, would not be appropriate. The time
between the occurrence of the instant offense, the consideration of mental state, and the time
of trial is too removed; there is no way that a brain scan taken after the fact can confirm a
past mental state or condition. See T. V. Asokan, The Insanity Defense: Related Issues, 58

INDIAN J. PSYCHIATRY S191 (Suppl. 2 2016) ("In case of assessment of 'legal insanity,' any
description of past mental state is closer to a story than a depiction of an observable event.
Conclusion about past mental state with available present mental state findings is criticized
by some as interpretation of reality rather than identifying objective reality").
150 See supra note 100.
151

Brown & Murphy, supra note 42, at 1181.
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The Bob Dylan lyric we use in our title is surrounded by lines that tell us
the protagonist is "walking with you [his girlfriend, or more likely, exgirlfriend] in [his] head" and that "the clouds are weeping."l 5 2 All in all,
the images in this brilliant song are fairly depressing. But on point here:
fact-finders in criminal cases have an unquenchable thirst to learn what is in
the defendant's head. And many cases end with the defendant-or the
victim-weeping.1 53 We hope that a prudent approach to neuroimaging
evidence will ameliorate this situation.

152 DYLAN, supra note
1

Id.

17.

